Immigration detention: what the Act of 27 July 2026 changes

Act no. 2026-667 of 27 July 2026 rewrites three CESEDA provisions on immigration detention. It answers a ruling of the Constitutional Council while, in the same movement, extending the periods applicable to certain profiles. Here is what changes, and what does not.

The ordinary regime: 96 hours, then 30 days, then 90 days

Since Act no. 2025-796 of 11 August 2025, in force on 11 November 2025, the prefect may order detention for ninety-six hours (art. L. 741-1 CESEDA) where the person does not offer effective guarantees that they will not abscond and where no other measure appears sufficient to secure removal.

Beyond that point, only the sitting judge of the judicial court may authorise continued detention (art. L. 742-1). The first extension runs for twenty-six days (art. L. 742-3): thirty days in total. Two further thirty-day extensions are then possible, in the cases exhaustively listed in article L. 742-4 (absolute urgency or threat to public order, deliberate obstruction of removal, failure of the consulate to issue travel documents, lack of means of transport), bringing the maximum to sixty and then ninety days.

What the Act of 27 July 2026 adds

The Act of 27 July 2026, aimed at strengthening security, immigration detention and the prevention of terrorist risks, came into force on 29 July 2026.

It first rewrites article L. 742-6. The derogatory regime beyond ninety days, previously reserved for persons sentenced to a ban from French territory for acts of terrorism or expelled for conduct linked to terrorist activities, is extended. It may now apply to a foreign national who represents “a real, present and particularly serious threat to public order” and who has been finally convicted of one of the offences punishable by five years’ imprisonment or more listed by the text: offences against the person (Book II of the Criminal Code), aggravated theft with violence, extortion, destruction and damage dangerous to persons, and criminal conspiracy for those purposes. Detention may then be extended by renewable thirty-day periods, up to one hundred and eighty days.

It then amends article L. 742-7: exceptionally, in cases of obstruction or material impossibility of carrying out removal (points 2 and 3 of article L. 742-4), one final thirty-day extension may be ordered. Total detention may then not exceed two hundred and ten days.

Finally, it rewrites article L. 741-7, which governs repeated detention orders. A fresh order (specifically reasoned and taking account of previous periods of detention), may only be issued after forty-eight hours, unless the previous detention ended because the person absconded. Above all, the cumulative duration for the enforcement of one and the same removal decision may not exceed three hundred and sixty days (five hundred and forty under the article L. 742-6 regime), and no more than five detention orders may be issued. The judge must verify that the deprivation of liberty does not exceed what is strictly necessary, in the light of the periods already served.

An answer to the Constitutional Council

That last point matters. In decision no. 2025-1172 QPC of 16 October 2025, the Constitutional Council held the former article L. 741-7 contrary to article 66 of the Constitution: the provisions then in force set neither a limit on the number of detention orders that could be issued on the basis of the same removal decision, nor any maximum overall duration of the deprivation of liberty.

Repeal was deferred to 1 November 2026, the Council requiring in the meantime that the sitting judge, when seised of a fresh detention order, verify that the deprivation of liberty does not exceed what is strictly necessary. The Act of 27 July 2026 fills that gap (a cap on the number of orders, a maximum cumulative duration, judicial review written into the statute), while extending the periods applicable to profiles regarded as dangerous.

What this means in practice

• The ordinary periods are unchanged: ninety-six hours, then thirty days, then ninety days at most.
• The one-hundred-and-eighty and two-hundred-and-ten-day regimes remain derogatory: they require a terrorism-related measure or a final conviction for exhaustively listed offences.
• Every extension remains subject to judicial review of procedural regularity, of the effective exercise of rights in detention and of the diligence shown by the administration.
• A fresh detention order after release must be specifically reasoned and take account of the periods already served.

If you or a relative are concerned, the useful time is counted in hours: the firm acts on an emergency basis before the sitting judge and before the administrative court.